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European Central Bank working paper series 31Abstract. The ﬁxed rate tender is one of the main procedural formats relied
upon by central banks in their implementation of monetary policy. This fact
stands in a somewhat puzzling contrast to the prevalent view in the theoretical
literature that the procedure, by ﬁxing interest rate and quantity at the same
time, does not allow a strategic equilibrium. We show that an equilibrium
exists under general conditions even if bidders expect true demand to exceed
supply on average. The outcome is typically ineﬃcient. It is argued that the
ﬁxed rate tender, in comparison to other tender formats, may be an appropriate
instrument for central bank liquidity management when market conditions are
suﬃciently calm.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D44, E52
Keywords: Fixed rate tenders, rationing, equilibrium, ineﬃciency.
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The ﬁxed rate tender is one of the main mechanisms used by central banks in
their implementation of monetary policy. The Eurosystem, for instance, relied
on ﬁxed rate tenders to provide the banking system with cash reserves in its
regular open market operations from January 1999 through June 2000. The
Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, the Bundesbank as well as many
other central banks have been using ﬁxed rate tenders for many years. More
recently, ﬁxed rate tenders have been employed by the Eurosystem also in a
number of so-called ﬁne-tuning operations.3
Given their pervasive use in the practice of central banking, it is striking that the
existing theoretical literature has mostly rejected proportional rationing schemes
such as the ﬁxed rate tender on the grounds that a strategic equilibrium may not
be feasible (see Bénassy [6], Nautz and Oechssler [22], and Ehrhart [13, 14]). But
indeed, when the benchmark rate lies suﬃciently above the tender rate, as it may
happen, e.g., in the expectation of increasing interest rates, then any marginal
increase in the allotment creates a strictly positive proﬁt margin, making it
optimal to submit excessively large bids. With this logic being followed by all
participants in the tender, there cannot be an equilibrium.
In this paper, we show that a Bayesian equilibrium nevertheless exists in the
ﬁxed rate tender even if unconstrained bidders know that demand will exceed
supply. For a liquidity providing operation, for example, the intuition is that a
bidder with a given demand, who is uncertain about the allotment quota, faces
at r a d e - o ﬀ between obtaining “too little” and “too much” liquidity. Having
formed rational expectations about the allotment quota and the uncertainty
thereof, each bidder scales her bid optimally to balance this trade-oﬀ. It turns
out that the ﬁxed rate tender allows a Bayesian equilibrium under quite general
conditions provided that market conditions are not too extreme.
We also show that the equilibrium allocation resulting from ﬁxed rate tenders
is typically ineﬃcient, so that secondary market trading should be observable
after the tender. On the other hand, it is likely that the ineﬃciency is small
when the uncertainty about the allotment quota is limited, which should be the
case under “normal” market conditions.
3In a ﬁxed rate tender, an interest rate is announced before the auction. Then bidders
submit quantity bids, and bids are prorated if total demand exceeds the total amount supplied
by the central bank.
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main explanations for overbidding, the literature has stressed so far interest
rate expectations, a potentially tight allotment policy, adaptive behaviour, and
the fear of being squeezed in the last tender of a reserve maintenance period.
O u ra n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st w of u r t h e re x p l a n a t i o n sw h yﬁxed rate tenders may have
become less successful. Firstly, secondary markets, including markets for collat-
eral have become increasingly sophisticated and eﬃcient. The spread between
eﬀective bid and ask quotes may have tightened when compared to, e.g., the
situation in the German money market before January 1999. This makes it
more likely that either bid quotes lie above the tender rate, causing excessive
overbidding and inducing market participants to follow an adaptive disequilib-
rium behaviour, or ask quotes lie below the tender rate, causing underbidding
and an insuﬃcient performance of central bank liquidity management.
Another potential factor suggested by the present analysis is that with aggre-
gate information about liquidity becoming available for market participants,
uncertainty about aggregate demand may be signiﬁcantly reduced. However,
this uncertainty is identiﬁed as one of the critical conditions for an equilibrium
to exist. After all, when there is certainty that demand exceeds supply, there
cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, from the perspective of the central bank, this
would suggest a case for less transparency about liquidity conditions in the
market when the ﬁxed rate tender is employed.
Given that ﬁxed rate tenders allow the central bank to provide a very clear signal
about the current monetary policy stance, we conclude that these tenders can
indeed be an appropriate instrument for the implementation of monetary policy,
provided that market conditions are not too extreme.
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The ﬁxed rate tender is one of the main mechanisms used by central banks in
their implementation of monetary policy.4 The Eurosystem, for instance, relied
on ﬁxed rate tenders to provide the banking system with cash reserves in its
regular open market operations from January 1999 through June 2000. The
Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, the Bundesbank as well as many
other central banks have been using ﬁxed rate tenders for many years. More
recently, ﬁxed rate tenders have been employed by the Eurosystem also in a
number of so-called ﬁne-tuning operations.5
Given their pervasive use in the practice of central banking, it is striking that
the existing theoretical literature has mostly rejected proportional rationing
schemes such as the ﬁxed rate tender on the grounds that a strategic equilibrium
may not be feasible (see Bénassy [6], Nautz and Oechssler [22], and Ehrhart
[13, 14]). But indeed, when the market benchmark lies suﬃciently above the
tender rate, as it may happen, e.g., in the expectation of increasing interest
rates, then any marginal increase in the allotment creates a strictly positive
proﬁt margin, making it optimal to submit excessively large bids. With this logic
being followed by all participants in the tender, there cannot be an equilibrium.6
In this paper, we show that a Bayesian equilibrium nevertheless exists in the
ﬁxed rate tender even if unconstrained bidders know that demand will exceed
supply. For a liquidity providing operation, for example, the intuition is that a
bidder with a given demand, who is uncertain about the allotment quota, faces
at r a d e - o ﬀ between obtaining “too little” and “too much” liquidity. Having
formed rational expectations about the allotment quota and the uncertainty
thereof, each bidder scales her bid optimally to balance this trade-oﬀ. It turns
out that the ﬁxed rate tender allows a Bayesian equilibrium under quite general
conditions provided that market conditions are not too extreme.
4According to Bindseil [8], “(n)early all central banks have sometimes used ﬁxed rate
tenders and in fact it even seems that the majority of central banks currently prefer it to
pure auctions.” Other main types of procedures used by central banks are the variable rate
tender with either uniform or discriminatory pricing rule, which have been studied ﬁrst in the
context of oil leases by Wilson [29].
5In a ﬁxed rate tender, an interest rate is announced before the auction. Then bidders
submit quantity bids, and bids are prorated if total demand exceeds the total amount supplied
by the central bank.
6Drazen [12] provides an insightful survey of traditional disequilibrium theory. Academic
interest in quantity rationing has been renewed in particular by the conference on central
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ensure existence may look familiar to the central banker with a background
in operational issues. The ﬁrst requirement, very weak in our view, will be
that the central bank’s forecasting of the true demand underlying the tender is
necessarily imperfect. Thus, there may be a small probability that the supply
of reserves exceeds the actual liquidity deﬁcit in the market to a non-marginal
extent.
The other requirement will be that an individual counterparty (i.e., a com-
mercial bank participating in the tender) expects aggregate true demand for
liquidity to be on average not much higher than supply. In our view, this as-
sumption is very plausible in markets for interbank liquidity, in which many
transactions just transfer money from one bank to another, keeping the ag-
gregate liquidity position of the banking system unaﬀected. Transactions that
aﬀect the liquidity position of the banking system (i.e., autonomous factors) can
be forecasted as an aggregate in a more or less reliable way by the central bank,
which adjusts supply accordingly. As a consequence, counterparties can expect
supply to cover, on average, a signiﬁcant fraction of the aggregate demand.
When these two conditions are satisﬁed, the ﬁxed rate tender allows a Bayesian
equilibrium in which excess demand translates in a straightforward way into
larger and more variable bids and consequently, into smaller and less predictable
allotment quotas. Even though a market price cannot be discovered with a ﬁxed
rate tender, still some implicit form of information aggregation appears to take
place. Indeed, while higher bids indicate a larger gap between demand and
supply, the uncertainty about the extent of overbidding replaces the rationing
function usually assigned to the market price.
It will not surprise the reader that the equilibrium allocation resulting from ﬁxed
rate tenders is typically ineﬃcient. Typically means here under the mild con-
dition that true demand exceeds supply with strictly positive probability. The
ineﬃciency arises because the individual bidder, as a consequence of individual
rationality, must obtain “too much” liquidity with strictly positive probability.
B u tt h i si si n e ﬃcient!
We are not ﬁrst in discussing bidding behaviour in ﬁx e dr a t et e n d e r s .I nas e m i -
nal contribution, Ayuso and Repullo [3] explain the overbidding observed in the
Eurosystem over the period January 1999 through June 2000 as a consequence
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 554
November 2005of an asymmetric objective function for the central bank. As market rates go
up in response to a tight allotment policy, bidders submit increasingly higher
bids to work against the rationing. However, with bids reaching excessively high
levels, the submission of a bid that exceeds the given stock of collateral incurs
the risk of being penalised by the central bank, so that an equilibrium can be
obtained. Ayuso and Repullo’s model diﬀers from our model by its focus on the
case of excessive overbidding, which implies a cost even for the announcement
of bids.
Bindseil [8] provides an excellent survey of the experience with ﬁxed rate tenders
by modern central banks, stressing in particular the case of the Eurosystem.
He also analyses the aggregate behaviour of a banking system facing a cost of
bidding that depends on the total bid.7 Välimäki [27] assumes that a bank may
have to pay a two-part penalty consisting of a rate on missing collateral and a
ﬁxed amount for non-compliance. He then studies the decision of an individual
bank to bid optimally against a given probability distribution of aggregate bids
submitted by the other banks.
Ehrhart [14] extends and reﬁnes the Bénassy-Nautz-Oechssler non-existence re-
sult in several directions, analysing in particular the case of repeated interaction.
Most relevantly for the present analysis, the paper also contains a numerical ex-
ample of an equilibrium with uncertainty about supply which entails a similar
strategic reasoning on the part of the individual bidder as suggested by the
present analysis. It will be noted, however, that in Ehrhart’s approach, the ba-
sic uncertainty about the allotment quota is caused by uncertainty about supply,
while in our model this uncertainty is caused by uncertainty about the demand
of other bidders.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model. Section 3 discusses existence of equilibrium in ﬁxed rate tenders.
Eﬃciency is treated in Section 4. Section 5 presents two tractable examples.
Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains formal proofs of Theorems 1 and
2, as well as some technical material used in the discussion of the examples.
7See also Bindseil [7].
8The rationing game is also discussed in the literature on supply chain management, where
it arises in a natural way when several independent retailers send their orders to a com-
mon supplier. Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang [17] describe an equilibrium in a model with
exogenous cost functions and perfect information.
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A central bank wishes to distribute a given quantity of a perfectly divisible
good, which is normalised to one for notational convenience. There are n ≥ 2
counterparties in the market. The preferences of an individual counterparty i
may depend on a type parameter θi, which is assumed to be observable only
by counterparty i. It is common knowledge, however, that the θi are drawn ex
ante from a set Θi =[ 0 ;θi] for some θi ∈ (0;1), according to a joint probability
distribution µ, which is assumed to possess a strictly positive density on the





vi(xi,θ i)dxi − ti,
where qi is the quantity obtained, vi(xi,θ i) is the marginal valuation of bidder i
with type θi at quantity qi,a n dti is the transfer paid by bidder i. We will assume
that vi(xi,θ i) is continuously diﬀerentiable on R+ × Θi,w h e r e∂vi/∂qi < 0.9
It will be noted without diﬃculty that the framework is one of private values
(each bidder knows his valuation function), in which values are not necessarily
independent, and in which bidders may be heterogeneous ex ante.
The counterparties participate in a ﬁxed rate tender. The central bank an-
nounces that the good will be sold at a price p0. The working of the mechanism
is then as follows. First, counterparties submit nonnegative bids bi(θi) ≥ 0.T h e





Proportional rationing is applied when aggregate demand exceeds supply. Thus,
if b(θ1,...,θ n) ≤ 1,t h e nc o u n t e r p a r t yi obtains a quantity
qi(θ1,...,θn)=bi(θi)
equal to the submitted bid. However, if the total of incoming bids exceeds






9In the case of a liquidity providing operation of the Eurosystem, decreasing marginal
valuations may result from various factors. First, opportunity costs of collateral vis-á-vis the
central bank may be increasing. Second, the eligibility criteria imposed on interbank collateral
may diﬀer from the criteria imposed on central bank collateral. Finally, a commercial bank
may attach a premium to interbank lending, either in terms of perceived risks or in terms of
a regulatory opportunity cost (see Bindseil, Weller, and Wuertz [9]).
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given by
ti(θ1,...,θ n)=p0qi(θ1,...,θn).
Given these rules of the rationing game, it is clear that the bidders’ marginal
valuations must satisfy a number of restrictions to make the problem interesting.
Speciﬁcally, we will assume that vi(0,θ i) >p 0 for all counterparties i and for
all types θi > 0. Without this assumption, type θi of counterparty i has a
dominant strategy of not participating. Similarly, we assume that vi(qi,θ i) <p 0
for qi suﬃciently large. Without this assumption, the decision problem for
the individual counterparty may not be well-deﬁned. As vi(qi,θ i) is strictly
decreasing in qi, there is a well-deﬁned quantity qi such that vi(qi,θ i)=p0.W e
will refer to this quantity as the demand of type θi. To ease the exposition,
it will be imposed that for any given qi ≥ 0, there is at most one type with
demand θi = qi. We may then rename the types without loss of generality,
so that vi(θi,θ i)=p0. Following from this convention, type and demand of a
counterparty are two words with the same meaning.10
As discussed in the Introduction, the existence of an equilibrium may not be
guaranteed in ﬁxed rate tenders when aggregate demand is both strong and
deterministic. This well-known result generalises in a straightforward way to
a set-up with incomplete information about demand.11 Nautz and Oechssler
[22] argue convincingly that adaptive behaviour may replace rational behaviour
when the circumstances of the tender exclude the possibility of equilibrium be-
haviour. Having pointed out that the non-existence result stands in a somewhat
puzzling contrast to the widespread use of the ﬁxed rate tender by central banks,
we will show now that an equilibrium may indeed exist when market demand
is “close to balanced”.
3. Existence
The approach followed in the proof of the existence theorem is to focus on
an equilibrium candidate in which there is an upper bound on the extent of
overbidding. Speciﬁcally, we will assume that bidder i of type θi is considering
10The results of this paper do not appear to depend on this assumption.
11If needed, a formal statement and proof can be obtained from the authors.
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j 6= i satisfy
bj(θj) ≤ αθj (1)
for some given overbidding factor α>1. Then, provided that bids will be












As marginal valuations are strictly declining, the inequality allows to put an
upper bound on the “marginal loss” that an individual counterparty must accept
in the case when she obtains too little liquidity. Under certain assumptions
discussed below, this type of argument allows to derive that also bidder i does
not exaggerate her true demand by a factor of more than α, i.e.,
bi(θi) ≤ αθi.( 2 )
In this case, the extent of overbidding ﬁnds a ﬁnite limit, leading to the existence
theorem stated below.
The result relies on two main assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that there is
enough uncertainty about the true demand of the other bidders. Formally, let







the set of all type vectors θ−i so that aggregate demand is less than q.W es a y







θjdµ(θ−i|θi) ≥ ε (3)
for each counterparty i and for each type θi. This condition says intuitively
that conditional on aggregate demand being low, the expected demand of the
other counterparties never becomes negligible, uniformly over counterparty i’s
demand.
Such an assumption is not implausible in a central bank context. It is also
an intuitive condition for an equilibrium to exist. After all, in the absence of
uncertainty about true demand, each counterparty could perfectly predict the
bids submitted by the other bidders. An equilibrium can then exist only when
12
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uncertainty about the true demand of the other bidders implies an uncertainty
of the individual bidder as to the extent to which his strategic bid will be
rationed. With decreasing marginal valuations, this implies a cost to excessive
overbidding.
T h es e c o n dm a i na s s u m p t i o ni st h a to na verage, true demand must not exceed
supply by too much. Formally, denote by





the set of all type vectors θ−i such that aggregate demand exceeds supply. We






θj − 1)dµ(θ−i|θi) ≤ δ
for each i and for each θi. It will become clear that this condition allows for the
interesting case that expected demand is known to be higher than supply. Such
a situation is feasible, e.g., if the forecasting of autonomous liquidity factors is
subject to a misspeciﬁcation, or if the central bank submits consistently too little
liquidity, as suggested by the analysis of Ayuso and Repullo [3]. Whatever the
precise interpretation, the relative generality allowed by the second assumption
should in any case add a signiﬁcant degree of robustness to prior existence results
that relied on the assumption that supply exceeds demand with probability one.
Theorem 1. Assume that forecasting is imperfect and that demand is balanced.
Then the ﬁxed rate tender allows a Bayesian equilibrium, which is possibly in
mixed strategies.
A formal proof can be found in the Appendix. Theorem 1 oﬀers a rationale for
the use of ﬁxed rate tenders with proportional quantity rationing in the prac-
tice of contemporaneous central banking. In fact, the balancedness assumption
suggests why we observe the ﬁxed rate procedure especially in central bank
liquidity management. After all, when the central bank aims at neutralising
liquidity ﬂuctuations between the banking sector and the remaining part of the
economy, then the demand structure in the banking sector is captured in a
rather intuitive way by the balancedness criterion.12
12Theorem 1 may also shed light on the fact that the ﬁxed rate tender format has not been
used by the Federal Reserve System. Given that the Fed faces a seasonal demand for reserves
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It is generally perceived that rationing generates ineﬃcient allocations. Indeed,
when both price and quantity are held ﬁxed at the same time, there is no
obvious mechanics by which demand and supply should be matched.13 As the
previous section has shown, this general argument is somewhat qualiﬁed in
the presence of incomplete information. When demand is not deterministic, the
scarcity of supply in relation to market demand will be reﬂected by the extent of
overbidding, and therefore in the more pronounced trade-oﬀ between obtaining
too much and too little of the good. Thus, even though the tender price does
not increase in response to stronger demand, so does the expected variability
of the allotment quota, and therefore also the cost of overstating demand in
the bid. Why then do we obtain an ineﬃcient allocation? The point is that
in equilibrium, the individual bidder has to be uncertain about the resulting
allocation. With strictly positive probability, the allotment will be larger than
desired. As will be argued below, this drives the ineﬃciency.
The deﬁnition of allocative eﬃciency is repeated here for the convenience of the
reader. An ex-post allocation q =( q1,...,q n) is feasible if qi ≥ 0 for all i and
Pn







vi(xi,θ i)dxi − p0qi}
the welfare associated with an ex-post allocation q in a state θ.T h e r e a d e r
will note that no positive welfare is associated with any fraction of the good
potentially left with the auctioneer, e.g., following an episode of insuﬃcient
demand. A feasible ex-post allocation q is eﬃcient if it maximises the welfare
functional under the feasibility constraint. The ineﬃciency of the ﬁxed rate
tender can now be stated without further assumptions as follows.
Theorem 2. Assume that
Pn
i=1 θi > 1 with strictly positive probability. Then
any Bayesian equilibrium of the ﬁxed-price tender is ex-post ineﬃcient.
T h ep r o o fi si nt h eA p p e n d i x .T h eT h e o r e ms a y st h a tt h eo u t c o m eo ft h eﬁxed
rate tender is typically ineﬃcient. Trading in the secondary markets in response
to allotment decisions should therefore be observable. The intuitive reason for
13Bindseil [8] suitably compares the problems created by extreme forms of overbidding with
the ineﬃciencies arising from queuing.
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the bid. An eﬃcient allocation never allocates too much of the good to an
individual bidder. However, as explained in the previous section, this feature
is inconsistent with the individual proﬁt maximisation of the individual bidder
in the relevant scenario where demand exceeds supply with positive probability.
In equilibrium, the individual counterparty must be uncertain about whether
the allotment will be higher or lower than her demand at the tender rate. For
example, if the counterparty knew with certainty that the allotment will exceed
her demand, then she would downsize the bid correspondingly. Similarly, if
the counterparty knew with certainty that the allotment will be lower than her
demand, then the bid should be increased. This simple argument shows that
the equilibrium allocation in a ﬁxed rate tender will always be ineﬃcient unless
it is obvious that rationing does not occur.
In our view, the ineﬃciency identiﬁed in Theorem 2 does not make ﬁxed rate
tenders an inappropriate instrument for central bank liquidity management.
While the procedure deﬁnitely leads to ineﬃcient outcomes, the extent of these
ineﬃciencies may be small when the uncertainty about the allotment quota is
limited, as should be the case under “normal” market conditions. Moreover, the
extent of the ineﬃciency may be smaller than the ineﬃciencies arising from al-
ternative auction formats, such as the variable rate tender with either uniform or
discriminatory pricing. After all, both the uniform and the discriminatory pric-
ing rules are known to cause diﬀerential incentives for bid shading and thereby
an ineﬃciency. Moreover, this ineﬃciency may be signiﬁcant if the population
of bidders is either small or, as in the case of the Eurosystem, markedly hetero-
geneous.14 It should also be noted that the main criticism from the market side
about the use of ﬁxed rate tenders during the episode of extreme overbidding in
the Eurosystem seemingly has been that the unequal situation regarding eligible
collateral across countries of the euro area implied “unjust” advantages for some
counterparties. We will discuss further advantages and disadvantages of ﬁxed
rate tenders in the conclusion.
5. Examples
Mainly for illustrative purposes, this section develops two simple set-ups in
which Bayesian equilibrium strategies can be computed in an explicit fashion.
14See Ausubel and Cramton [1], Back and Zender [4], Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [15,
16], and Swinkels [25, 26].
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are derived from the possibility for counterparties to trade in a secondary market
in the presence of non-trivial transaction costs. The second set-up entails the
somewhat unexpected feature that an equilibrium can be obtained even when
there is common knowledge among the bidders that bids will be prorated.
Bid-ask spreads. There are n ≥ 2 counterparties. For every counterparty i,
there are two types θi < θi.M o r e o v e r ,0 <θ i < 1/n for i =1 ,...,n.T oo b t a i na n
equilibrium it must be imposed that for all bidders i, the conditional probability
π(θ−i|θi) that all types are high given that counterparty i is of the high type, is







a if qi ≤ θi
pi
b if qi >θ i,
for prices pi
a >p i
0 = p0 + εi >p i
b. The constant εi ≥ 0 can be interpreted as
idiosyncratic transaction costs, and can be set to zero. In the context of open
market operations, the assumptions on the valuations may be interpreted in the
sense that an individual bank faces a strictly positive spread between lending
and deposit rates, with εi representing roughly the individual opportunity costs
of collateral.
Consider an equilibrium candidate in which only the high types overbid, and in








for all i. Under these conditions, only high types bother to overbid. This feature




















Equation (5) implies a straightforward comparative statics with respect to the
parameters characterising the bidding environment of any counterparty i. E.g.,
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ing due to a lowered credit rating, i.e., when pi
a increases, then funding through
central bank operations becomes increasingly attractive for i and aggregate de-
mand goes up. Similarly, when counterparty i, maybe in response to a higher
perceived uncertainty about overall ﬁnancial stability, assigns a higher cost to
deposits, e.g., by reducing risk limits for unsecured loans extended in the in-
terbank market, then pi
b increases, excess liquidity becomes undesirable, and
consequently aggregate demand decreases. If transaction costs εi increase for
some i, demand declines as well. Finally, if an individual counterparty’s de-
mand is stronger positively correlated with aggregate demand, i.e., if π(θ−i|θi)
increases ceteris paribus, then demand will increase due to the higher expected
rationing.
Always-rationing equilibria. Our second example illustrates the possibility
that an equilibrium may exist even if the probability of rationing is one. There




i (1 − qi)
.( 7 )








for some constant µ>1, according to the triangular density
g(θi)=
2(µ +1 ) ( 1− θi)
µ − 1
.





In this particular case, marginal valuations fall quickly, and the probability of
high types, who overbid more excessively, is comparably low, which allows an
equilibrium. The details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
6. Concluding remarks
Fixed rate tenders are one of the main procedures by which central banks may
seek control of liquidity conditions in the interbank market for overnight de-
posits. The use of this tender format has recently come under criticism in
17
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euro area during the initial phase of Stage III of EMU. Speciﬁcally, it had been
argued in the literature that tenders with a posted price are inconsistent with
equilibrium behaviour on the part of counterparties participating in the ten-
der, and that the ﬁxed rate tender format is consequently not an appropriate
instrument for the implementation of monetary policy.
In the formal analysis, we have shown that ﬁxed rate tenders may indeed allow
equilibrium behaviour provided that counterparties possess private information
and market conditions are suﬃciently calm. Speciﬁcally, we have oﬀered a
simple model in which bidders with quantity demand face an uncertainty about
the allotment quota, giving rise to a trade-oﬀ between obtaining “too little” and
“too much” liquidity. Thus, in our model, the limiting eﬀect on bids is caused
by the fact that with a certain probability, demand by the other bidders will be
weak, and the allotment may turn much larger than needed.16
In addition, we showed in the framework of the model that, as a consequence
of the demand uncertainty necessary to sustain equilibrium behaviour, the out-
come of the ﬁxed rate tender is typically ineﬃcient. But we also argued that
these ineﬃciencies may be small under “normal” market conditions, and would
therefore play a subordinate role for the regular implementation of monetary
policy.
It is clear that a single model cannot capture the full list of pros and cons that
ultimately determine the central bank’s choice of a speciﬁc procedural format.
Other factors inﬂuencing this decision may include, but are not limited to, the
extent to which a tender signals the current stance of monetary policy, the ex-
tent to which quantitative objectives can be implemented, the principle of equal
treatment vis-à-vis individual counterparties, as well as informational eﬃciency.
The experience in the Eurosystem suggests that, among the various procedures
in use, ﬁxed rate tenders perform optimally with respect to the signaling func-
tion, and maybe less optimally with respect to some of the other objectives that
may be pursued with an individual operation. E.g., during the period of ex-
cessive overbidding, counterparties with limited access to eligible collateral may
have been at a disadvantage compared to other bidders. Moreover, in recent
16Seller discretion and uncertainty about supply, especially towards the upside, should fur-
ther stabilise bidding behaviour. Related arguments have been made in a more auction theo-
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has on some occasions not reached the benchmark allotment.
Why have ﬁxed rate tenders performed less well in more recent times? As the
main explanations for overbidding, the literature has stressed so far interest
rate expectations, a potentially tight allotment policy, adaptive behaviour, and
the fear of being squeezed in the last tender of a reserve maintenance period.17
O u ra n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st w of u r t h e re x p l a n a t i o n sw h yﬁxed rate tenders may have
become less successful. Firstly, secondary markets, including markets for collat-
eral have become increasingly sophisticated and eﬃcient. The spread between
eﬀective bid and ask quotes may have tightened when compared to, e.g., the
situation in the German money market before January 1999. This makes it
more likely that either bid quotes lie above the tender rate, causing excessive
overbidding and inducing market participants to follow an adaptive disequilib-
rium behaviour, or ask quotes lie below the tender rate, causing underbidding
and an insuﬃcient performance of central bank liquidity management.18
Another potential factor suggested by the present analysis is that with fore-
casting becoming increasingly precise, and more and more information about
aggregate liquidity conditions being provided to the market, the uncertainty
about aggregate demand may be signiﬁcantly reduced. However, this uncer-
tainty has been identiﬁed as one of the critical conditions for an equilibrium to
exist. Thus, from the perspective of the central bank, this would suggest a case
for less transparency about liquidity conditions in the market when the ﬁxed
rate tender is employed.
While the ﬁxed rate tender may be inappropriate under special circumstances as
identiﬁed by previous research, the results obtained in this paper suggest that
when market conditions are “normal”, the procedure may indeed work quite
smoothly. As a consequence, given that the signalling function may occasionally
dominate the other objectives, we conclude that ﬁxed rate tenders, at least under
suﬃciently calm market conditions, can indeed be an appropriate instrument
for the implementation of monetary policy.
17See Ayuso and Repullo [2], Nautz and Oechssler [23], and Nyborg and Strebulaev [24].
An additional role may have played the fact that the Bundesbank [11] still required bids to
be collateralised.
18The break-down of an equilibrium in a mechanism with quantity rationing under a more
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P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Consider a proﬁle of measurable bidding strategies
{bi(.)}i=1,...,n in the ﬁxed rate tender. It is clear that a type θi =0cannot gain
from submitting a strictly positive bid. On the other hand, no type θi rationally
submits a bid bi <θ i.W em a yt h e r e f o r ea s s u m ei nt h es e q u e lt h a tθi > 0 and
that bi > 0 without making additional arguments. The expected utility of a






{vi(xi,θ i)dxi − ti(θi,θ −i)}dµ(θ−i|θi),










bi if bi + b−i ≤ 1
bi
bi + b−i
if bi + b−i > 1






{vi(xi,θ i)dxi − p0b qi(bi,b −i)}dFθi(b−i),( 9 )
where Fθi(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable b−i
deﬁned by (8). Let Z(bi)={1 − bi} denote the zero set where the map bi →
b qi(bi,b −i) is not diﬀerentiable. As b qi(bi,b −i) is a continuous function of b−i,
and the point set Z(bi) varies in a diﬀerentiable way with bi,o n em a ya p p l y










Decomposing the right-hand side of (10) according to whether the counterparty





























is the aggregate bid of the other bidders that implies an allotment of qi = θi > 0
to counterparty i. We will now assume that (1) is satisﬁed for all counterparties
j 6= i. We claim that for bi >α θ i, the left-hand side (LHS) of the ﬁrst-order
condition (11) exceeds the right-hand side (RHS).
RHS. The function ∂vi/∂qi is continuous on the closed and bounded set
Ωi = {(qi,θ i)|0 ≤ qi ≤ θi and θi ∈ Θi},
so that, by Weierstrass’ theorem, there is a constant λ>0 such that
∂vi
∂qi
(qi,θ i) ≥− λ (12)
for all (qi,θ i) ∈ Ωi. Figure 1 illustrates the intuitive meaning of the constant λ.
As a consequence of (12),
vi(qi,θ i) − p0 = vi(qi,θ i) − vi(θi,θ i) ≤ λ(θi − qi) (13)
for any (qi,θ i) ∈ Ωi. Substituting qi by b qi(bi,b −i) in (13) yields
vi(b qi(bi,b −i),θ i) − p0 ≤ λ(θi − b qi(bi,b −i)) (14)
for all b−i ≥ b0
−i. Since the right-hand side of (14) is concave in b−i,
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b−i=b0
−i
{θi − b qi(bi,b −i)}






Thus, for all b−i ≥ b0
−i,
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w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a td e m a n di sb a l a n c e d .
LHS. If the imperfect forecasting condition (3) is satisﬁed for some q and some
ε,t h e ni ti sa l s os a t i s ﬁed for any q0 >q ,a n dt h es a m eε. Without loss of







As the function ∂vi/∂qi is continuous and strictly negative on the compact set
Ω0
i = {(qi,θ i)|θi ≤ qi ≤
θi
q
and θi ∈ Θi},
there is a constant β>0, independent of i and θi,s u c ht h a t
∂vi
∂qi
(qi,θ i) ≤− β
for all (qi,θ i) ∈ Ω0








> max{0;1 − bi}
denote the aggregate bid by bidders j 6= i such that the allotment for bidder i
is θi/q. Then, as marginal valuations are decreasing, and because b qi(bi,b −i) is
22
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q
−i that
p0 − vi(b qi(bi,b −i),θ i) ≥ p0 − vi(b qi(bi,b
q
−i),θ i)





























for 1 − bi <b −i ≤ b
q
−i. But inequality (16) is also satisﬁed when b−i ≤ 1 − bi









































θj ≤ q then b−i(θ−i) ≤ b
q
−i.
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November 2005which can be satisﬁed for some α if δ is not too large, this implies that (10) is
negative for all bi >α θ i. As (10) is strictly positive for type θi > 0 and bid
bi =0 , bidder i with type θi will bid at most αθi. Thus, the existence problem
of the ﬁxed rate tender is reduced to the problem of ﬁnding an equilibrium of
the Bayesian game in which each bidder i of type θi ∈ Θi chooses a multiplier
α∗
i(θi) ∈ [1;α] corresponding to a bid b∗
i(θi)=α∗
i(θi)θi.T h e a s s e r t i o n o f t h e
Theorem follows then from a standard existence result for Bayesian games with
compact strategy sets and continuous utility functions (see Milgrom and Weber
[21], Theorem 1 in combination with Proposition 3). ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Consider a Bayesian equilibrium {b∗
i(.)}i=1,...,n.I g -
noring the zero set on which the rationing rule is only continuous, but not






















An ex-post allocation q∗ =( q∗
1,...,q∗
n) that is eﬃcient in state θ =( θ1,...,θn)
satisﬁes vi(q∗
i ,θ i) ≥ p0.M o r e o v e r , e ﬃciency implies vi(q∗
i ,θ i) >p 0 for all i
whenever
Pn
i=1 θi > 1.A s∂b qi/∂bi > 0, this contradicts (17). ¤
Lemma A.1 There is an equilibrium in the ﬁrst example of Section 5 (“Bid-ask
spreads”) in which bids are given by
bi =( n − 1)
ϑi +
P




for the high types of counterparty i.
Proof. Under the assumptions made, counterparty i’s problem is given by


































= ϑi(bi + b−i). (20)
Adding (20) up over i =1 ,...,nand rearranging yields (5). The bid of the high
type of counterparty i can be rewritten as





































which proves (18). It remains to be shown that the two inequalities in (4) are
satisﬁed. By (20), the ﬁrst inequality in (4) is equivalent to
θi + ϑi(bi + b−i)2 < 1.













ϑj <n− 1. (22)
To ﬁnd some solution for these two inequalities, restrict probabilities π(θ−i|θi)
for the moment such that
ϑ = ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ... = ϑn. (23)







for i =1 ,...,n. A solution to these inequalities can be determined by appropriate
choices for the probabilities π(θ−i|θi). We can then drop restriction (23) again
25
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and (22) are fulﬁlled provided that π(θ−i|θi) ∈ Xi.T h i sp r o v e st h ea s s e r t i o n .
¤
Lemma A.2. There is an equilibrium in the second example of Section 5 (“Al-
ways rationing equilibria”) in which bids are given by bi(θi)=µθi/(1 − θi).
Proof. Assume that counterparty j follows the equilibrium strategy, i.e., bj(θj)=
µθj/(1 − θj) for all θj. Then, clearly, bj(θj) ≥ 1 for all types θj ≥ 1/(1 + µ),s o






(1 − θj)bi + θjµ
. (24)
Denote the cdf belonging to g(θi) by G(θi). It is straightforward to check that
the problem of counterparty i is concave, and that the ﬁrst-order condition reads
Z θ
θ
θi − qi(bi,b j(θj))
qi(bi,b j(θj))
dG(θj)=0 . (25)






yields the assertion. ¤
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